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Abstract
Boudou and the authors have recently introduced the intuitionistic temporal
logic ITLe and shown it to be decidable. In this article we show that the ‘henceforth’-
free fragment of this logic is complete for the class of non-deterministic quasi-
models introduced by Ferna´ndez-Duque [14]. From this and results of Boudou,
Romero and the authors [4], we conclude that this fragment is also complete for
the standard semantics of ITLe over the class of expanding posets.
1 Introduction
Intuitionistic logic is the basis for constructive reasoning and temporal logics are an
important tool for reasoning about dynamic processes. One would expect that a com-
bination of the two would yield a powerful framework in which to model phenomena
involving both computation and time, an idea explored by Davies [6] and Maier [25].
This is not the only potential application of such a logic: in view of the topological
interpretation of the intuitionistic implication, one may instead use it to model space
and time [14]. This makes it important to study these logics, which in particular did
not previously enjoy a complete axiomatization in the presence of ‘infinitary’ tenses.
Our goal in this paper is to present such an axiomatization for ‘next’ and ‘eventually’.
1.1 State-of-the-art
There are several (poly)modal logics which may be used to model time, and some have
already been studied in an intuitionistic setting, e.g. tense logics by Davoren [7] and
propositional dynamic logic with iteration by Nishimura [27]. Here we are specifically
concernedwith intuitionistic analogues of discrete-time linear temporal logic. Versions
of such a logic in finite time have been studied by Kojima and Igarashi [21] and Kamide
∗martin.dieguez@enib.fr
†david.fernandezduque@ugent.be
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and Wansing [20]. Nevertheless, logics over infinite time have proven to be rather
difficult to understand, in no small part due to their similarity to intuitinoistic modal
logics such as IS4, whose decidablitiy has long remained open [28].
In recent times, Balbiani, Boudou and the authors have made some advances in
this direction, showing that the intermediate logic of temporal here-and-there is decid-
able and enjoys a natural axiomatization [3] and identifying two conservative temporal
extensions of intuitionistic logic, denoted ITLe and ITLp (see §2.1). These logics are
based on the temporal language with l (‘next’),♦ (‘eventually’) andl (‘henceforth’);
note that unlike in the classical case, the latter two are not inter-definable [2]. Both log-
ics are given semantically and interpreted over the class of dynamic posets, structures
of the form F “ pW,ď, Sq where ď is a partial order onW used to interpret implica-
tion and S : W Ñ W is used to interpret tenses. If w ď v implies that Spwq ď Spvq
we say thatF is an expanding poset; ITLe is then defined to be the set of valid formulas
for the class of expanding posets, while ITLp is the logic of peristent posets, where F
has the additional backward confluence condition stating that if v ě Spwq, then there
is u ě w such that Spuq “ v.
Unlike ITLe, the logic ITLp satisfies the familiar Fischer Servi axioms [16]; never-
theless, ITLe has some technical advantages. We have shown that ITLe has the small
model property while ITLp does not [5]; this implies that ITLe is decidable. It is cur-
rently unknown if ITLp is even axiomatizable, and in fact its modal cousin LTL ˆ S4
is not computably enumerable [17]. On the other hand, while ITLe is axiomatizable in
principle, the decision procedure we currently know uses model-theoretic techniques
and does not suggest a natural axiomatization.
In [4] we laid the groundwork for an axiomatic approach to intuitionistic tempo-
ral logics, identifying a family of natural axiom systems that were sound for different
classes of structures, including a ‘minimal’ logic ITL0 based on a standard axiomatiza-
tion for LTL. There we consider a wider class of models based on topological semantics
and show that ITL0 is sound for these semantics, while
(a) lpp_ qq Ñ ♦p_lq (b) lplpÑ pq ^lpp_ qq Ñ p_lq
are Kripke-, but not topologically, valid, from which it follows that these principles are
not derivable in ITL0.
On the other hand, it is also shown in [4] that for ϕ P L♦, the following are equiv-
alent:
1. ϕ is topologically valid,
2. ϕ is valid over the class of expanding posets,
3. ϕ is valid over the class of finite quasimodels.
Quasimodels are discussed in §3 and are the basis of the completeness for dynamic
topological logic presented in [15], which works for topological, but not Kripke, se-
mantics. This suggests that similar techniques could be employed to give a complete-
ness proof for a natural logic over thel-free fragment, but not necessarily over the full
temporal language; in fact, we do not currently have a useful notion of quasimodel in
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the presence ofl. Moreover, (a) and (b) are not valid in most intuitionistic modal log-
ics, and there is little reason at this point to suspect that no other independent validities
are yet to be discovered. For this reason, in this manuscript we restrict our attention to
the l-free fragment of the temporal language, which we denote L♦, and we will work
with the logic ITL
0
♦, a l-free version of ITL
0
.
1.2 Our main result
The goal of this article is to prove that ITL0♦ is complete for the class of non-deterministic
quasimodels (Theorem 5). The completeness proof follows the general scheme of that
for linear temporal logic [24]: a set of ‘local states’, which we will call moments, is
defined, where a moment is a representation of a potential point in a model (or, in our
case, a quasimodel). To each momentw one then assigns a characteristic formula χpwq
in such a way that χpwq is consistent if and only if w can be included in a model, from
which completeness can readily be deduced.
In the LTL setting, a moment is simply a maximal consistent subset of a suitable fi-
nite set Σ of formulas. For us a moment is instead a finite labelled tree, and the formula
χpwq must characterize w up to simulation; for this reason we will henceforth write
Simpwq instead of χpwq. The required formulas Simpwq can readily be constructed in
L♦ (Proposition 2).
Note that it is failure of Simpwq that characterizes the property of simulating w,
hence the possible states will be those moments w such that Simpwq is unprovable.
The set of possible moments will form a quasimodel falsifying a given unprovable
formula ϕ (Corollary 1). Thus any unprovable formula is falsifiable, and Theorem 5
follows. We then conclude from Theorem 3, proven in Boudou et al. [4], that any
unprovable formula is also falsifiable in an expanding poset (Corollary 2).
Layout
Section 2 introduces the syntax and semantics of ITLe, and Section 3 discusses la-
belled structures, which generalize both models and quasimodels. Section 4 discusses
the canonical model, which properly speaking is a deterministic weak quasimodel.
Section 5 reviews simulations and dynamic simulations, including their definability in
the intuitionistic language. Section 6 constructs the initial quasimodel and establishes
its basic properties, but the fact that it is in fact a quasimodel is proven only in Sec-
tion 7 where it is shown that the quasimodel is ω-sensible, i.e. it satisfies the required
condition to interpret♦. The completeness of ITL0♦ follows immediately from this fact.
In Appendix A we include the proof that the canonical model is a weak quasimodel,
Appendix B gives an explicit construction of simulation formulas and Appendix C
reviews the construction of the initial weak quasimodel from [14].
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2 Syntax and semantics
Fix a countably infinite set P of ‘propositional variables’. The languageL of intuition-
istic (linear) temporal logic ITL is given by the grammar
K | p | ϕ^ ψ | ϕ_ ψ | ϕÑ ψ | l ϕ | ♦ϕ | lϕ,
where p P P. As usual, we use  ϕ as a shorthand for ϕ Ñ K and ϕ Ø ψ as a
shorthand for pϕ Ñ ψq ^ pψ Ñ ϕq. We read l as ‘next’, ♦ as ‘eventually’, and l as
‘henceforth’. Given any formula ϕ, we denote the set of subformulas of ϕ by subpϕq.
We will work mainly in the language L♦, defined as the sublanguage of L without the
modality l, although the full language will be discussed occasionally.
2.1 Semantics
Formulas of L are interpreted over expanding posets. An expanding poset is a tu-
ple D “ p|D|,ďD, SDq, where |D| is a non-empty set of moments, ďD is a partial
order over |D|, and SD is a function from |D| to |D| satisfying the forward conflu-
ence condition that for all w, v P |D|, if w ďD v then SDpwq ď SDpvq. We will
omit the subindices in ďD, SD when D is clear from context and write v ă w if
v ď w and v ­“ w. An intuitionistic dynamic model, or simply model, is a tuple
M “ p|M|,ďM, SM, VMq consisting of an expanding poset equipped with a valua-
tion function V from |M| to sets of propositional variables that is ď-monotone, in the
sense that for all w, v P W, if w ď v then V pwq Ď V pvq. In the standard way, we
define S0pwq “ w and, for all k ą 0, Skpwq “ S
`
Sk´1pwq
˘
. Then we define the
satisfaction relation |ù inductively by:
1. M, w |ù p if p P V pwq;
2. M, w ­|ù K;
3. M, w |ù ϕ^ ψ if M, w |ù ϕ andM, w |ù ψ;
4. M, w |ù ϕ_ ψ if M, w |ù ϕ orM, w |ù ψ;
5. M, w |ù lϕ if M, Spwq |ù ϕ;
6. M, w |ù ϕÑψ if @v ě w, ifM, v |ù ϕ thenM, v |ù ψ;
7. M, w |ù ♦ϕ if there exists k such that M, Skpwq |ù ϕ;
8. M, w |ù lϕ if for all k,M, Skpwq |ù ϕ.
As usual, a formula ϕ is valid over a class of models Ω if, for every world w of every
model M P Ω, M, w |ù ϕ. The set of valid formulas over an arbitrary expanding
poset will be called ITLe, or expanding intuitionistic temporal logic; the terminology
was coined in [5] and is a reference to the closely-related expanding products of modal
logics [17]. The main result of [5] is the following.
Theorem 1. ITLe is decidable.
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Nevertheless, Theorem 1 is proved using purely model-theoretic techniques that do
not suggest an axiomatization in an obvious way. In [4] we introduced the axiomatic
system ITL0, inspired by standard axiomatizations for LTL. As we will see, adapting
this system to L♦ yields a sound and complete deductive calculus for the class of
expanding posets.
2.2 The axiomatization
Our axiomatization obtained from propositional intuitionistic logic [26] by adding stan-
dard axioms and inference rules of LTL [24], although modified to use ♦ instead of l.
To be precise, the logic ITL0♦ is the least set of L♦-formulas closed under the following
axiom schemes and rules:
(A1) All intuitionistic tautologies
(A2)  lK
(A3) lϕ^lψ Ñ lpϕ^ ψq
(A4) lpϕ_ ψq Ñ lϕ_lψ
(A5) lpϕÑ ψq Ñ plϕÑ lψq
(A6) ϕ_l♦ϕÑ ♦ϕ
(R1)
ϕ ϕÑ ψ
ψ
(R2)
ϕ
lϕ
(R3)
ϕÑ ψ
♦ϕÑ ♦ψ
(R4)
lϕÑ ϕ
♦ϕÑ ϕ
The axioms (A2)-(A5) are standard for a functional modality. Axiom (A6) is the
dual of lϕ Ñ ϕ ^ llϕ. The rule (R3) replaces the dual K-axiom lpϕ Ñ ψq Ñ
p♦ϕÑ ♦ψq, while (R4) is dual to the induction rule ϕÑlϕ
ϕÑlϕ . As we show next, we can
also derive the converses of some of these axioms. Below, for a set of formulas Γ we
define lΓ “ tlϕ : ϕ P Γu, and empty conjunctions and disjunctions are defined byŹ
∅ “ J and
Ž
∅ “ K.
Lemma 1. Let ϕ P L♦ and Γ Ď L♦ be finite. Then, the following are derivable in
ITL
0
♦:
1. l
Ź
ΓØ
Ź
lΓ
2. l
Ž
ΓØ
Ž
lΓ
3. ♦ϕÑ ϕ_l♦ϕ.
Proof. For the first two claims, one direction is obtained from repeated use of axioms
(A3) or (A4) and the other is proven using (R2) and (A5); note that the second claim
requires (A2) to treat the case when Γ “ ∅. Details are left to the reader.
For the third claim, reasoning within ITL0♦, note that ϕ Ñ ♦ϕ holds by (A6) and
propositional reasoning, hence lϕ Ñ l♦ϕ by (R2), (A5) and (R1). By similar rea-
soning, l l ♦ϕ Ñ l♦ϕ holds, hence so does lϕ _ l l ♦ϕ Ñ l♦ϕ. Using (A4)
and some propositional reasoning we obtain lpϕ_l♦ϕq Ñ ϕ_l♦ϕ. But then, by
(R4), ♦pϕ_l♦ϕq Ñ ϕ_l♦ϕ; since ♦ϕÑ ♦pϕ_l♦ϕq can be proven using (R3),
we obtain ♦ϕÑ ϕ_l♦ϕ, as needed.
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For purposes of this discussion, a logic may be any set Λ Ď L, and we may write
Λ $ ϕ instead of ϕ P Λ. Then, Λ is sound for a class of structures Ω if, whenever
Λ $ ϕ, it follows that Ω |ù ϕ. The following is essentially proven in [4]:
Theorem 2. ITL0♦ is sound for the class of expanding posets.
Note however that a few of the axioms and rules have been modified to fall within
L♦, but these modifications are innocuous and their correctness may be readily checked
by the reader. We remark that, in contrast to Lemma 1, plp Ñ lqq Ñ lpp Ñ qq is
not valid [2], hence by Theorem 2, it is not derivable.
3 Labelled structures
The central ingredient of our completeness proof is given by non-deterministic quasi-
models, introduced by Ferna´ndez-Duque in the context of dynamic topological logic
[10] and later adapted to intuitionistic temporal logic [14].
3.1 Two-sided types
Quasimodels are structures whose worlds are labelled by types, as defined below. More
specifically, following [4], our quasimodels will be based on two-sided types.
Definition 1. Let Σ Ď L♦ be closed under subformulas andΦ
´,Φ` Ď Σ. We say that
the pair Φ “ pΦ´; Φ`q is a two-sided Σ-type if:
(a) Φ´ X Φ` “ ∅,
(b) Φ´ Y Φ` “ Σ,
(c) K R Φ`,
(d) if ϕ^ ψ P Σ, then ϕ^ ψ P Φ` if and only if ϕ, ψ P Φ`,
(e) if ϕ_ ψ P Σ, then ϕ_ ψ P Φ` if and only if ϕ P Φ` or ψ P Φ`,
(f) if ϕÑ ψ P Φ`, then either ϕ P Φ´ or ψ P Φ`, and
(g) if ♦ϕ P Φ´ then ϕ P Φ´.
The set of two-sided Σ-types will be denoted TΣ.
We will write Φ ďT Ψ if Φ
` Ď Ψ` (or, equivalently, if Ψ´ Ď Φ´). If Σ Ď ∆
are both closed under subformulas, Φ P TΣ and Ψ P T∆, we will write Φ ĎT Ψ if
Φ´ Ď Ψ´ and Φ` Ď Ψ`.
Often (but not always) we will want Σ to be finite, in which case given ∆ Ď L♦
we write Σ Ť ∆ if Σ is finite and closed under subformulas. It is not hard to check
that ďT is a partial order on TΣ. Whenever Ξ is an expression denoting a two-sided
type, we write Ξ´ and Ξ` to denote its components. Elements of TL♦ are full types.
Note that Ferna´ndez-Duque [14] uses one-sided types, but it is readily checked that a
one-sided Σ-type Φ as defined there can be regarded as a two-sided type Ψ by setting
Ψ` “ Φ and Ψ´ “ ΣzΦ. Henceforth we will refer to two-sided types simply as types.
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3.2 Quasimodels
Next we will define quasimodels; these are similar to models, except that valuations are
replaced with a labelling function ℓ. We first define the more basic notion ofΣ-labelled
frame.
Definition 2. Let Σ Ď L♦ be closed under subformulas. A Σ-labelled frame is a triple
F “ p|F |,ďF , ℓFq, where ďF is a partial order on |F | and ℓF : |F | Ñ TΣ is such
that
(a) whenever w ďF v it follows that ℓF pwq ďT ℓFpvq, and
(b) whenever ϕÑ ψ P ℓ´Fpwq, there is v ďF w such that ϕ P ℓ
`
Fpvq and ψ P ℓ
´
Fpvq.
We say that F falsifies ϕ P L♦ if ϕ P ℓ
´pwq for some w PW .
As before, we may omit the subindexes in ďF , SF and ℓF when F is clear from
context. Labelled frames model only the intuitionistic aspect of the logic. For the
temporal dimension, let us define a new relation over types.
Definition 3. Let Σ Ď L♦ be closed under subformulas. We define a relation STĎ
TΣ ˆ TΣ by Φ ST Ψ iff for all ϕ P L:
(a) if lϕ P Φ` then ϕ P Ψ`,
(b) if lϕ P Φ´ then ϕ P Ψ´,
(c) if ♦ϕ P Φ` and ϕ P Φ´ then ♦ϕ P Ψ`, and
(d) if ♦ϕ P Φ´, then ♦ϕ P Ψ´.
Quasimodels are then defined as labelled frames with a suitable binary relation.
Definition 4. Given Σ Ď L♦ closed under subformulas, a Σ-quasimodel is a tuple
Q “ p|Q|,ďQ, SQ, ℓQq where p|Q|,ďQ, ℓQq is a labelled frame and SQ is a binary
relation over |Q| that is
1. serial: for all w P |Q| there is v P |Q| such that w SQ v;
2. forward-confluent: if w ďQ w
1 and w SQ v, there is v
1 such that v ďQ v
1 and
w1 SQ v
1;
3. sensible: if w SQ v then ℓQpwq ST ℓQpvq, and
4. ω-sensible: whenever ♦ϕ P ℓ`
Q
pwq, there are n ě 0 and v such that w SnQ v and
ϕ P ℓ`Qpvq.
A forward-confluent, sensible Σ-labelled frame is a weak Σ-quasimodel, and if SQ is
a function we say thatQ is deterministic.
We may write quasimodel instead of Σ-quasimodel when Σ is clear from context,
and full quasimodel instead of L♦-quasimodel. Similar conventions apply to labelled
structures, weak quasimodels, etc.
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w
S
v
w1
S
ď
v1
ď
Figure 1: If S is forward-confluent, then the above diagram can always be completed.
Definition 5. Let Q be a weak quasimodel and let U be such that U Ď |Q|. The
restriction of Q with respect to U is defined to be the structure
Q æ U “ p|Q æ U |,ďQæU , SQæU , ℓQæU q,
where:
1. |Q æ U | “ U ;
2. ďQæU “ ďQ X pU ˆ Uq;
3. SQæU “ SQ X pU ˆ Uq;
4. ℓQæU “ ℓQ X pU ˆ TΣq.
Lemma 2. IfQ is a weak quasimodel, U Ď |Q| is upward closed and SQ æ U is serial
and ω-sensible, thenQ æ U is a quasimodel.
Proof. We must show thatQ satisfies all properties of Definition 4. First we check that
pU,ďQæU , ℓQæU q
is a labelled frame. The relation ďQæU is a partial order, since restrictions of partial
orders are partial orders. Similarly, if x ďQæU y it follows that x ďQ y, so that from
the definition of ℓQæU it is easy to deduce that ℓQæU pxq ďT ℓQæU pyq.
To check that condition (b) holds, let us take x P U and a formula ϕ Ñ ψ P
ℓ´
QæU pxq. By definition, ϕ Ñ ψ P ℓ
´
Qpxq so there exists y P |Q| such that x ďQ y,
ϕ P ℓ`
Q
pyq and ψ P ℓ´
Q
pyq. Note that, since U is upward closed then y P U and, by
definition, x ďQæU y, ϕ P ℓ
`
QæU pyq and ψ P ℓ
´
QæU pyq, as needed.
Now we check that the relation SQæU satisfies (1)-(4). Note that SQæU is serial and
ω-sensible by assumption and it is clearly sensible as SQ was already sensible, so it
remains to see that SQæU is forward-confluent. Take x, y, z P U such that x ďQæU y
and x SQæU z. By definition x ďQ y and x SQ y. Since SQ is confluent, there
exists t P |Q| such that z ďQ t and y SQ t. Since U is upward closed t P U and, by
definition, y SQæU t and zďQæU t.
The following result of [4] will be crucial for our completeness proof.
Theorem 3. A formula ϕ P L♦ is falsifiable over the class of expanding posets if and
only if it is falsifiable over the class of finite, subpϕq-quasimodels.
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As usual, if ϕ is not derivable, we wish to produce an expanding poset where ϕ is
falsified, but in view of Theorem 3, it suffices to falsify ϕ on a quasimodel. This is
convenient, as quasimodels are much easier to construct than models.
4 The canonical model
The standard canonical model for ITL0♦ it is only a full, weak, deterministic quasi-
model rather than a proper model. Nevertheless, it will be a useful ingredient in our
completeness proof. Since we are working over an intuitionistic logic, the role of max-
imal consistent sets will be played by prime types, which we define below; recall that
full types are elements of TL♦ .
Definition 6. Given two sets of formulas Γ and∆, we say that∆ is a consequence of Γ
(denoted by Γ $ ∆) if there exist finite Γ1 Ď Γ and∆1 Ď ∆ such that ITL0♦ $
Ź
Γ1 ÑŽ
∆1.
We say that a pair of sets Φ “ pΦ´,Φ`q is full if Φ´ Y Φ` “ L♦, and consistent
if Φ` & Φ´. A full, consistent type is a prime type. The set of prime types will be
denoted T8.
Note that we are using the standard interpretation of Γ $ ∆ in Gentzen-style cal-
culi. When working within a turnstyle, we will follow the usual proof-theoretic con-
ventions of writing Γ,∆ instead of ΓY∆ and ϕ instead of tϕu. Observe that there is
no clash in terminology regarding the use of the word type:
Lemma 3. If Φ is a prime type then Φ is an L♦-type.
Proof. Let Φ be a prime type; we must check that Φ satisfies all conditions of Defini-
tion 1. Condition (b) holds by assumption, and conditions (a) and (c) follow from the
consistency of Φ.
The proofs of the other conditions are all similar to each other. For example, for
(f), suppose that ϕ Ñ ψ P Φ` and ϕ R Φ´. Since Φ is full, it follows that ϕ P Φ`.
But
`
ϕ ^ pϕ Ñ ψq
˘
Ñ ψ is an intuitionistic tautology, so using the fact that Φ is
consistent we see that ψ R Ψ´, which once again using condition (b) gives us ψ P Φ`.
For condition (g) we use (A6): if ♦ϕ P Φ´ and ϕ P Φ` we would have that Φ is
inconsistent, hence ϕ P Φ´. The rest of the conditions are left to the reader.
As with maximal consistent sets, prime types satisfy a Lindenbaum property.
Lemma 4 (Lindenbaum Lemma). Let Γ and ∆ be sets of formulas. If Γ & ∆ then
there exists a prime type Φ such that Γ Ď Φ` and∆ Ď Φ´.
Proof. The proof is standard, but we provide a sketch. Let ϕ P L♦. Note that either
Γ, ϕ & ∆ or Γ & ∆, ϕ, for otherwise by a cut rule (which is intuitionistically admissi-
ble) we would have Γ $ ∆. Thus we can add ϕ to ΓY∆, and by repeating this process
for each element of L♦ (or using Zorn’s lemma) we can find suitable Φ.
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Given a set A, let IA denote the identity function on A. Then, the canonical model
Mc is then defined as the labelled structure
Mc “ p|Mc|,ďc, Sc, ℓcq
def
“ pTL♦ ,ďT , ST , IT8q æ T8;
in other words, Mc is the set of prime types with the usual ordering and successor
relations. Note that ℓc is just the identity (i.e., ℓcpΦq “ Φ). We will usually omit
writing ℓc, as it has no effect on its argument.
Proposition 1. The canonical model is a deterministic weak quasimodel.
Proof. In view of Definition 4, we need 1. p|Mc|,ďc, ℓcq to be a labelled frame, 2. Sc
to be a sensible forward-confluent function, and 3. ℓc to have TL♦ as its codomain.
The first item is Lemma 7 in the Appendix. That Sc is a forward-confluent function is
Lemma 8, and it is sensible sinceΦ Sc Ψ precisely whenΦ ST Ψ. Finally, ifΦ P |Mc|
then ℓcpΦq “ Φ, which is an element of TL♦ by Lemma 3.
5 Simulations
Simulations are relations between worlds in labelled spaces, and give rise to the ap-
propriate notion of ‘substructure’ for modal and intuitionistic logics. We have used
them to prove that a topological intuitionistic temporal logic has the finite quasimodel
property [14], and they will also be useful for our completeness proof. Below, recall
that Φ Ď Ψ means that Φ´ Ď Φ´ and Φ` Ď Φ`.
Definition 7. LetΣ Ď ∆ Ď L♦ be closed under subformulas,X be a Σ-labelled frame
and Y be ∆-labelled. A forward-confluent relation E Ď |X | ˆ |Y| is a simulation if,
whenever x E y, ℓX pxq ĎT ℓYpyq. If there exists a simulation E such that x E y, we
write pX , xqÝ pY, yq.
The relation E is a dynamic simulation between X and Y if SYE Ď ESX .
y
SY
y1
x
SX
E
x1
E
Figure 2: If E Ď |X | ˆ |Y| is a dynamical simulation, this diagram can always be
completed.
The following is proven in [14]. While the details of the construction given there
are not important for our current purposes, the interested reader may find an overview
in Appendix C. Below, recall that Σ Ť L♦ means that Σ is finite and closed under
subformulas.
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Theorem 4. Given Σ Ť L♦, there exists a finite weak quasimodel IΣ such that if A
is any deterministic weak quasimodel then Ý Ď |IΣ| ˆ |A| is a surjective dynamic
simulation.
Points of IΣ are called moments. One can think of IΣ as a finite initial structure
over the category of labelled weak quasimodels. Next, we will internalize the notion of
simulating elements of IΣ into the temporal language. This is achieved by the formulas
Simpwq given by the next proposition.
Proposition 2. Given Σ Ť L♦ and a finite Σ-labelled frame W , there exist formulas
pSimpwqqwP|W| such that for any fully labelled frame X , w P |W | and x P |X |,
Simpwq P ℓ´pxq if and only if there is y ě x such that pW , wqÝ pX , yq.
Proof. An explicit construction is given in Appendix B.
The next proposition allows us to emulate model-theoretic reasoning within L♦.
Proposition 3. Fix Σ Ť L♦ and let I “ IΣ, w P |I| and ψ P Σ.
1. If ψ P ℓ´pwq, then $ ψ Ñ Simpwq.
2. If ψ P ℓ`pwq, then $
`
ψ Ñ Simpwq
˘
Ñ Simpwq.
3. If w ď v, then $ Simpvq Ñ Simpwq.
4. $
ľ
ψPℓ´
I
pwq
Simpwq Ñ ψ.
5. $ l
ľ
wSIv
Simpvq Ñ Simpwq.
Proof. (1) First assume that ψ P ℓ´pwq, and toward a contradiction that & ψ Ñ
Simpwq. By the Lindenbaum lemma there is Γ P |Mc| such that ψ Ñ Simpwq P Γ
´.
Thus for some Θ ěc Γ we have that ψ P Θ
` and Simpwq P Θ´. But then by
Proposition 2 we have that pW , wq Ý pMc,∆q for some ∆ ěc Θ, so that ψ P ∆
´,
and by upwards persistence ψ P Θ´, contradicting the consistency of Θ.
(2) If ψ P ℓ`pwq, we proceed similarly. Assume toward a contradiction that &
`
ψ Ñ
Simpwq
˘
Ñ Simpwq. Then, reasoning as above there is Θ P |Mc| such that ψ Ñ
Simpwq P Θ` and Simpwq P Θ´. From Proposition 2 we see that there is ∆ ěc Θ
such that pW , wq Ý pMc,∆q, so that ψ P ∆
` and, once again by Proposition 2,
Simpwq P ∆´. It follows that ψ Ñ Simpwq R ∆`; but in view of upward persistence,
this contradicts that ψ Ñ Simpwq P Θ`.
(3) Suppose that v ě w. Reasoning as above, it suffices to show that if Γ P |Mc|
is such that Simpwq P Γ´, then also Simpvq P Γ´. But if Simpwq P Γ´, there is
Θ ěc Γ such that pI, wq Ý pMc,Θq. By forward confluence pI, vq Ý pMc,∆q
for some ∆ ěc Θ. Thus by Proposition 2, Simpvq P ∆
´ and by upwards persistence
Simpvq P Γ´. Since Γ P |Mc| was arbitrary, the claim follows.
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(4) We prove that if Γ P |Mc| is such that
ľ
ψPℓ´pwq
Simpwq P Γ`, (1)
then ψ P Γ`. If (1) holds then by Theorem 4, there is w P |I| with pI, wqÝ pMc,Γq.
By Proposition 2, Simpwq P Γ´, hence it follows from (1) that ψ R ℓ´pwq; but w is
Σ-typed and ψ P Σ, so ψ P ℓ`pwq and thus ψ P Γ`, as required.
(5) Suppose that Γ P |Mc| is such that
l
ľ
wSIv
Simpvq P Γ`, (2)
and assume toward a contradiction that Simpwq P Γ´. Then pI, wq Ý pMc,∆q for
some ∆ ěc Γ. Since Ý is a dynamic simulation, it follows that there is v P |I|
with w SI v and pI, vq Ý
`
Mc, Scp∆q
˘
. But ∆ ěc Γ, so that by Proposition 2,
Simpvq P S´c pΓq, contradicting (2).
6 The initial quasimodel
We are now ready to define our initial quasimodels. Given a finite set of formulas Σ,
we will define a quasimodel JΣ falsifying all unprovable Σ-types. This quasimodel
is a substructure of IΣ, containing only moments which are possible in the following
sense:
Definition 8. Fix Σ Ť L♦. We say that a moment w P |IΣ| is possible if & Simpwq,
and denote the set of possible Σ-moments by JΣ.
With this we are ready to define our initial structure, which as we will see later is
indeed a quasimodel.
Definition 9. Given Σ Ť L♦, we define the initial structure for Σ by JΣ “ IΣ æ JΣ.
Our strategy from here on will be to show that canonical structures are indeed
quasimodels; once we establish this, completeness of ITL0♦ is an easy consequence.
The most involved step will be showing that the successor relation on JΣ is ω-sensible,
but we begin with some simpler properties.
Lemma 5. Let Σ be a finite set of formulas, I “ IΣ and J “ JΣ. Then, |J| is an
upward-closed subset of |I| and SJ is serial.
Proof. To check that |J| is upward closed, let w P |J| and suppose v ě w. Now, by
Proposition 3.3, we have that
$ Simpvq Ñ Simpwq;
hence if w is possible, so is v.
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To see that SJ is serial, observe that by Proposition 3.5, if w P |J| for all w P |I|,
$ l
ľ
wSIv
Simpvq Ñ Simpwq;
since w is possible, it follows that for some v with w SI v, v is possible as well, and
thus v P |J|.
7 ω-Sensibility
In this section we will show that SJ is ω-sensible, the most difficult step in proving that
J is a quasimodel. In other words, we must show that, givenw P |J| and ♦ψ P ℓ`pwq,
there is a finite path
w “ w0 S w1 S . . . S wn,
where ψ P ℓ`pwnq and wi P |J| for all i ď n.
Definition 10. Let Σ Ť L♦ and w, v P JΣ. Say that v is reachable from w if there is a
finite path
ÝÑu “ pu0, ..., unq
of possible moments with u0 “ w, un “ v, and ui S ui`1 for all i ă n. We denote the
set of all possible moments that are reachable from w by Rpwq.
Lemma 6. If Σ Ť L♦ and w P |JΣ| then
$ l
ľ
vPRpwq
Simpvq Ñ
ľ
vPRpwq
Simpvq.
Proof. Let I “ IΣ. By Proposition 3.5 we have that, for all v P Rpwq,
$ l
ľ
vSIu
Simpuq Ñ Simpvq.
Now, if u R JΣ, then $ Simpuq, hence by (R2) $ lSimpuq, and we can remove
Simpuq from the conjunction using Lemma 1 and propositional reasoning. Since v P
Rpwq was arbitrary, this shows that
$ l
ľ
vPRpwq
Simpvq Ñ
ľ
vPRpwq
Simpvq.
From this we obtain the following, which evidently implies ω-sensibility:
Proposition 4. If w P |JΣ| and ♦ψ P ℓpwq, then there is v P Rpwq such that ψ P ℓpvq.
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Proof. Towards a contradiction, assume that w P JΣ and ♦ψ P ℓ
`pwq but, for all
v P Rpwq, ψ P ℓ´pwq.
By Lemma 6,
$ l
ľ
vPRpwq
Simpvq Ñ
ľ
vPRpwq
Simpvq.
But then we can use the ♦-induction rule (R4) to show that
$ ♦
ľ
vPRpwq
Simpvq Ñ
ľ
vPRpwq
Simpvq;
in particular,
$ ♦
ľ
vPRpwq
Simpvq Ñ Simpwq. (3)
Now let v P Rpwq. By Proposition 3.1 and the assumption that ψ P ℓ´pvq we have
that
$ ψ Ñ Simpvq,
and since v was arbitrary,
$ ψ Ñ
ľ
vPRpwq
Simpvq.
Using distributivity (R3) we further have that
$ ♦ψ Ñ ♦
ľ
vPRpwq
Simpvq.
This, along with (3), shows that
$ ♦ψ Ñ Simpwq;
however, by Proposition 3.2 and our assumption that ♦ψ P ℓ`pwq we have that
$
`
♦ψ Ñ Simpwq
˘
Ñ Simpwq,
hence by modus ponens we obtain $ Simpwq, which contradicts the assumption that
w P JΣ. We conclude that there can be no such w.
Corollary 1. Given any finite set of formulas Σ, JΣ is a quasimodel.
Proof. Let J “ JΣ. By Lemma 5, |J| is upwards closed in |IΣ| and SJ is serial, while
by Proposition 4, SJ is ω-sensible. It follows from Lemma 2 that J is a quasimodel.
We are now ready to prove that ITL0♦ is complete for the class of quasimodels.
Theorem 5. If ϕ P L♦ is such that ITL
0
♦ & ϕ, then ϕ is falsifiable on a finite subpϕq-
quasimodel.
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Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose ϕ is an unprovable formula and let
W “
 
w P Isubpϕq : ϕ P ℓpwq
(
.
Then, by Proposition 3.4 we have that
$
ľ
wPW
Simpwq Ñ ϕ;
sinceϕ is unprovable, it follows that somew˚ PW is possible and hencew˚ P Jsubpϕq.
By Corollary 1, Jsubpϕq is a quasimodel.
In view of Boudou et al. [4], we immediately obtain completeness for the class of
expanding posets.
Corollary 2. Given ϕ P L♦, ITL
0
♦ $ ϕ if and only if ϕ is valid over the class of
expanding posets.
Proof. Soundness is Theorem 2 and completeness follows from Theorems 5 and 3.
Concluding remarks
We have provided a sound and complete axiomatization for the l-free fragment of
the expanding intuitionistic temporal logic ITLe. With this we may develop syntactic
techniques to decide validity over the class of expanding posets, complementing the
semantic methods presented by Boudou and the authors [5] and possibly leading to an
elementary decision procedure.
Many questions remain open in this direction, perhaps most notably an extension
to the full language with l. This is likely to be a much more challenging problem, as
the language with ‘henceforth’ can distinguish between Kripke and topological models
and hence methods based on non-deterministic quasimodels do not seem feasible.
The question of axiomatizing ITLp (with persistent domains) is also of interest,
but here it is possible that the logic is not even axiomatizable in principle. It may be
that methods from products of modal logics [23] can be employed here; for example,
one can reduce tiling or related problems to show that certain products such as LTLˆ
S4 are not computably enumerable. However, even if such a reduction is possible,
working over the more limited intuitionistic language poses an additional challenge.
Even computational lower bounds for these logics are not yet available, aside from the
trivial PSPACE bound obtained from the purely propositional fragment.
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A Properties of the canonical model
The structureMc is not a propermodel, as it is not ω-sensible. However, it comes quite
close; it is a full, weak, deterministic quasimodel. We prove that it has all properties
required by Definition 4.
Lemma 7. Mc is a labelled frame.
Proof. We know that ďT is a partial order and restrictions of partial orders are partial
orders, so ďc is a partial order. Moreover, ℓc is the identity, so Φ ďc Ψ implies
ℓcpΦq ďT ℓcpΨq.
Now let Φ P |Mc| and assume that ϕ Ñ ψ P Φ
´. Note that Φ`, ϕ & ψ, for oth-
erwise by intuitionistic reasoning we would have Φ` $ ϕ Ñ ψ, which is impossible
if Φ is a prime type. By Lemma 4, there is a prime type Ψ with Φ` Y tϕu Ď Ψ` and
ψ P Ψ´. It follows that Φ ďc Ψ, ϕ P Ψ
` and ψ P Ψ´, as needed.
Lemma 8. Sc is a forward-confluent function.
Proof. For a set Γ Ď L♦, recall that we have defined lΓ “ tlϕ : ϕ P Γu. It will be
convenient to introduce the notation
aΓ “ tϕ : lϕ P Γu.
With this, we show that Sc is functional and forward-confluent.
FUNCTIONALITY. We claim that for all Φ,Ψ P |Mc|,
Φ Sc Ψ if and only if Ψ “ paΦ
´,aΦ`q. (4)
We must check that Ψ P |Mc|. To see that Ψ is full, let ϕ P L♦ be so that ϕ R Ψ
´.
It follows that lϕ R Φ´, but Φ is full, so lϕ P Φ` and thus ϕ P Ψ`. Since ϕ was
arbitrary,Ψ´ YΨ` “ L♦.
Next we check that Ψ is consistent. If not, let Γ Ď Ψ` and ∆ Ď Ψ´ be finite and
such that
Ź
ΓÑ
Ž
∆ is derivable. Using (R2) and (A5) we see thatl
Ź
ΓÑ l
Ž
∆
is derivable, which in view of Lemma 1 implies that
Ź
lΓ Ñ
Ž
l∆ is derivable as
well. But lΓ Ď Φ` and l∆ Ď Φ´, contradicting the fact that Φ is consistent.
Thus Ψ P |Mc|, and Φ Sc Ψ holds provided that Φ ST Ψ. It is clear that clauses
(a) and (b) of Definition 3 hold. If ♦ϕ P Φ` and ϕ R Φ`, it follows that ϕ P Φ´. By
Lemma 1 ♦ϕÑ ϕ_l♦ϕ is derivable, so we cannot have that l♦ϕ P Φ´ and hence
l♦ϕ P Φ`, so that ♦ϕ P Ψ`. Similarly, if ♦ϕ P Φ´ we have that l♦ϕ P Φ´, for
otherwise we obtain a contradiction from (A6). Therefore, ♦ϕ P Ψ´ as well.
To check that Ψ is unique, suppose that Θ P |Mc| is such that Φ Sc Θ. Then if
ϕ P Ψ` it follows from (4) that lϕ P Φ` and hence ϕ P Θ`; by the same argument,
if ϕ P Ψ´ it follows that ϕ P Θ´, and henceΘ “ Ψ.
FORWARD CONFLUENCE: Now that we have shown that Sc is a function, we may
treat it as such. Suppose that Φ ďc Ψ; we must check that ScpΦq ďc ScpΨq. Let
ϕ P S`c pΦq. Using (4), we have thatlϕ P Φ
`, hencelϕ P Ψ` and thus ϕ P ScpΨ
`q.
Since ϕ P ScpΦq was arbitrary we obtain S
`
c pΦq ďc S
`
c pΨq, as needed.
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B Simulation formulas
In this appendix, we show that there exist L♦ formulas defining points in finite frames
up to simulability, i.e. that if W is a finite frame and w P |W |, there exists a formula
Simpwq such that for all labelled frames M and all x P |M|, M, x |ù x if and
only if pW , wq Ý pM, xq. In contrast, such formulas do not exist in the classical
modal language for finite S4 models [11], but they can be constructed using a polyadic
‘tangled’ modality. This tangled modalilty was proven to be expressively equivalent
to the µ-calculus over transitive frames by Dawar and Otto [8], and later axiomatized
for several classes of models by Ferna´ndez-Duque [12] and Goldblatt and Hodkinson
[18, 19].
Simulation formulas were used in [15] to provide a sound and complete axiomati-
zation of dynamic topological logic [1, 22], a classical tri-modal system closely related
to ITLe, where the intuitionistic implication is replaced by an S4 modality. One can
use the fact that simulability is not definable over the modal language to prove that the
natural axiomatization suggested by Kremer and Mints [22] of dynamic topological
logic was incomplete for its topological, let alone its Kripke, semantics [13].
While simulability is not modally definable, it is definable over the language of
intuitionistic logic, as finite frames [9] (and hence models) are already definable up to
simulation in the intuitionistic language. This may be surprising, as the intuitionistic
language is less expressive than the modal language; however, intuitionistic models are
posets rather than arbitrary preorders, and this allows us to define simulability formulas
by recusion on ă.
Definition 11. Fix Σ Ť L♦ and letW be a finite Σ-labeled frame. Given w P |W |, we
define a formula Simpwq by backwards induction on ď “ ďW by
Simpwq “
ľ
ℓ`pwq Ñ
ł
ℓ´pwq _
ł
vąw
Simpvq.
Proposition 5. Given Σ Ť ∆ Ď L♦, a finite Σ-labelled frame W , a∆-labelled frame
X and w P |W |, x P |X |:
1. if Simpwq P ℓ´X pxq then there is y ě x such that pW , wqÝ pX , yq, and
2. if there is y ě x such that pW , wqÝ pX , yq then Simpwq R ℓ`X pxq.
Proof. Each claim is proved by backward induction on ď.
(1) Let us first consider the base case, when there is no v ą w. Assume that Simpwq P
ℓ´pxq. From the definition of labelled frame
Ź
ℓ`Wpwq P ℓ
`
X pyq and
Ž
ℓ´Wpwq P
ℓ´X pyq for some y ě x. From the definition of type it follows that ℓ
`
Wpwq Ď ℓ
`
X pyq
and ℓ´Wpwq Ď ℓ
´
X pyq, so that ℓWpwq ĎT ℓX pyq. It follows that E
def
“ tpw, yqu is a
simulation, so pW , wqÝ pX , yq.
For the inductive step, let us assume that the lemma is proved for all v ą w.
Assume that Simpwq P ℓ´
X
pxq. From Condition (b) it follows that
Ź
ℓ`
W
pwq P ℓ`
X
pyq,Ž
ℓ´Wpwq P ℓ
´
X pyq and
Ž
văw Simpvq P ℓ
´
X pyq for some y ě x. By following a similar
reasoning as in the base case we can conclude that ℓWpwq Ď ℓX pyq, and moreover, that
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Simpvq P ℓ´X pyq for all v ą w. By induction hypothesis we conclude that for all v ą w,
there exists a simulation Ev such that v Ev zv for some zv ě y. Let
E
def
“ tpw, yqu Y
ď
vąw
Ev .
The reader may check that E is a simulation and that w E y ě x, so that pW , wq Ý
pX , yq, as needed.
(2) For the base case, assume that pW , wq Ý pX , yq for some y ě x, so there exists a
simulation E such that w E y. It follows that ℓ`Wpwq Ď ℓ
`
X pyq and ℓ
´
Wpwq Ď ℓ
´
X pyq.
From conditions (d) and (e) of the definition of type (Definition 1), it follows thatŹ
ℓ`
W
pwq R ℓ´
X
pyq and
Ž
ℓ´
W
pwq R ℓ`
X
pyq. But then, condition (f) gives us Simpwq R
ℓ`X pyq, so Simpwq R ℓ
`
X pxq.
For the inductive step, by the same reasoning as in the base case it follows thatŹ
ℓ`
W
pwq R ℓ´
X
pyq and
Ž
ℓ´
W
pwq R ℓ`
X
pyq. Now, let v be such that v ą w. Since E
is forward confluent then v E zv for some zv ě y. By induction hypothesis, Simpvq R
ℓ`pzvq, so Simpvq R ℓ
`pyq. Since v was arbitrary we conclude that
Ž
vąw Simpvq R
ℓ`pyq. Finally, from condition (f) of Definition 1 and the fact that y ď x we get that
Simpwq R ℓ`pxq.
C The finite initial frame
In this appendix we review the construction of the structure IΣ of Theorem 4. The
worlds of this structure are called irreducible Σ-moments. The intuition is that a Σ-
moment represents all the information that holds at the same ‘moment of time’. Recall
that we write Σ Ť L♦ if Σ Ď L♦ is finite and closed under subformulas. We omit all
proofs, which can be found in [14].
Definition 12. LetΣ Ť L♦. A Σ-moment is a Σ-labelled spacew such that p|w|,ďwq
is a finite tree with unique root rw.
Note that moments can be arbitrarily large. In order to obtain a finite structure we
will restrict the set of moments to those that are, in a sense, no bigger than they need
to be. To be precise, we want them to be minimal with respect to E, which we define
below.
Definition 13. Let Σ Ť L♦ andw,v be Σ-moments. We write
1. w Ď v if |w| Ď |v|, ďw “ ďvæ |w|, and ℓw “ ℓv æ |w|;
2. w E v if ifw Ď v and there is a forward confluent, surjective function π : |v| Ñ
|w| such that ℓvpvq “ ℓwpπpvqq for all v P |v| and π
2 “ π. We say that w is a
reduct of v and π is a reduction.
Note that the condition π2 “ π is equivalent to requiring πpwq “ w whenever
w P |w|. Irreducible moments are the minimal moments underE.
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Definition 14. Let Σ Ť L♦. A Σ-moment w is irreducible if whenever w E v, it
follows thatw “ v. The set of irreducible moments is denoted IΣ.
To view IΣ as a labeled frame, we need to equip it with a suitable partial order.
Definition 15. Let w P IΣ. For w P |w|, let wrws “ w æ Òw, i.e.,
wrws “
`
Òw , ďw æ Òw , ℓw æ Òw
˘
.
We write v ď w if v “ wrws for some w P |w|.
It is shown in [14] that if w is irreducible and v ď w, v is irreducible as well. To
obtain a weak quasimodel, it remains to define a sensible relation on IΣ.
Definition 16. If Σ Ť L♦ and w,v P IΣ, we define v ÞÑ w if there exists a sensible,
forward-confluent relation S Ď |v| ˆ |w| such that rv S rw.
We are now ready to define our initial weak quasimodel.
Definition 17. Given Σ Ť L♦, we define I “ IΣ to be the structure p|I|,ďI , SI , ℓIq,
where |I| “ IΣ, v ďI w if and only if v ě w, w SI v if and only if w ÞÑ v, and
ℓIpwq “ ℓwprwq.
Note that in this construction, the moments accessible fromw are smaller thanw,
and thus we use the reverse partial order to interpret implication. The structure IΣ is
always finite, a fact that is used in an essential way in our completeness proof. Below,
2nm denotes the superexponential function.
Theorem 6. Let Σ Ť L♦ and let s “ #Σ. Then, IΣ is a weak Σ-quasimodel and
#IΣ ď 2
s2`s
s`1 . Moreover, if Σ Ť L♦ andA is any deterministic weak quasimodel then
Ý Ď IΣ ˆ |A| is a surjective dynamic simulation.
In fact, the claim proven in Ferna´ndez-Duque [14] is more general in that A may
belong to a wider class of topologicalweak qusimodels, but this special case will suffice
for our purposes.
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